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Abstract—Crowdsensing is for a few years a new way to
gather information. Most smartphones and mobile operating
systems provide applications which are able to sense and gather
several data from the environment of the device. Thanks to
this collected data, it is possible to combine information from
several probes. A very common use case is the collection of
network scans with location to help the localisation feature of
these devices. Nevertheless, most users are not aware of this
spying. The collected data might represent infringements of
privacy. One possible solution to keep gathering these data
while maintaining privacy would consist in device-to-device
communications in order to break the links between data
and users. In this article we propose an approach to test the
feasibility of such a system. We collected data from mobile
users to combine location and network scans data. With this
data, we test the accuracy level we can reach while using Wi-Fi
localisation. We analyse how a new measure should be pushed
and how many scans should be realised to provide location-
based Wi-Fi. We analyse the minimal dataset to cover the
set of locations covered by users and prove that a multi-user
gathering system can benefit the users.
Index Terms—Crowdsensing, Wi-Fi fingerprint-based localisa-
tion, measurement data
1. Introduction
Device-to-device communications is an aim of future
communications for several applications including cellular
offloading [1]. This type of communications can also be
envisaged as a technique to preserve privacy while collecting
data. One of the main drawbacks of most location-based
services is the revelation of points of interests (POI) of
the users [2]. Indeed, since GPS is energy-consuming and
provides a localisation after a few tens of seconds with
a cold start, several techniques of localisations based on
association of locations with ambient fingerprints have been
proposed [3]. The transmission of these data might reveal
POI of users.
This work was supported by the LABEX IMU (ANR-10-LABX-0088) of
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Most mechanisms aiming at preserving privacy rely
on datasets obfuscation to preserve users’ privacy or on
homomorphic encryption, while transmitting requests on lo-
calisation datasets to maintain users and datasets provider’s
privacy [4]. Concerning the homomorphic solution, it is
proposed in [4] for localisation-based services using Wi-
Fi fingerprints. When a user transmits queries containing
ambient Wi-Fi fingerprints, the dataset provider answers
with an estimated location, then user’s location is revealed.
That is why mechanisms based on homomorphic encryption
could handle this drawback. These two techniques which
shall provide privacy to users do not protect the feeders of
the datasets. Indeed, these datasets require that people car-
rying devices embedding Wi-Fi and localisation capabilities
transmit this data. The points of interests of these people
are revealed when they transmit it. This could be tackled by
device-to-device communications.
Device-to-device communications could be used to mix
data from several users so that users devices transmit small
parts of their collected dataset to other users they meet. Such
a scheme should determine which parts of the dataset should
be transmitted to other users so that no point of interests is
revealed to the other user. We can even imagine that users
define areas where they estimate points of interests exist
and they do not want the service enabled. Nevertheless,
such a system shall handle long links disruptions since the
encounters between the users are opportunistic. The system
should use protocols following the Delay/Disruption Toler-
ant Network paradigm [5] to be able to discover neighbours.
Then, data transmitted to the networks by devices would be
obfuscated by data coming from other users. However, if
the devices transmitted their whole dataset to every device
they meet, they would transmit huge data volumes. It is
then compulsory to transmit a minimal useful dataset. The
devices should determine if a Wi-Fi fingerprint should be
coupled to a location or if it is not required to store it.
Our aim is to test if a user-centric Wi-Fi localisation
scheme is viable and accurate. We consider that it is im-
portant for an user to keep its privacy, then the best way
for that is to transmit the least data. Devices would keep
a connection between locations and Wi-Fi fingerprints. We
focus on Wi-Fi fingerprints localisation scheme even if
other methods provide more accurate results [6], they are
not suitable for deployment on smartphones, but on Wi-
Fi Access Points (AP) which is out of the scope of this
paper. We will need metrics to compare two fingerprints.
We will use a common method to compute the euclidean
distance between two fingerprints [7]. Nevertheless, most
studies using the euclidean distance between two finger-
prints consider fingerprints as vectors of same size. This
assumption might be true in an indoor environment but not
for outdoor contexts. We will adapt the computation of this
distance to the intersection of Basic Service Set Identifiers
(BSSID) of two fingerprints.
We developed an Android application which, once in-
stalled on a mobile terminal, was collecting data from
several probes including Wi-Fi and localisation. Data was
collected raw and we had to pre-process it to be able to test
the feasibility of an user-centric Wi-Fi localisation service.
These deployments are described in Sec. 2 of the paper.
In addition, we present the methodology to determine the
strategy of nodes involved in a collaborative Wi-Fi finger-
print based localisation service and analyse the performance
in terms of geographic error and storage space in Sec. 3 of
the paper. Finally, Sec. 4 summarizes the conclusions of our
work.
2. Dataset Presentation
We deployed our application on 100 devices of volun-
teers. We have gathered data from 94 users. The six other
users might have not started their device. The data collected
was stored in a database and was identified per user and per
probe. For this study, we focus on Wi-Fi and localisation
probes. From this raw data we had to apply some processing
to be able to test the feasibility of an user-centric Wi-Fi-
based localisation service. The localisation probe stores and
transmits any location found by the system. This might be
a problem because when the device is turned off, the GPS
provides the last known location which might be far away
from the current position. The Wi-Fi probe provides the
results of a Wi-Fi scan pushed by the device. A Wi-Fi record
is not a fingerprint but the result of a Wi-Fi beacon or Wi-Fi
probe response.
Since each record has a timestamp, we computed for
each user the time difference between every successive Wi-
Fi record. We have analysed that most differences were less
than one second. We have then decided to use a threshold of
one second to determine whether a record were belonging
to a Wi-Fi fingerprint or to the next one. After that we
needed to link each Wi-Fi fingerprint with its location. For
each user we have computed the time difference of each
fingerprint with a location record of the same user. From
this point we assumed that an user would not move a lot in
a few seconds between the real location of the fingerprint
and the location record. We have compared the results with a
threshold of one second and a threshold of ten seconds. The
latter provided a little bit more similarities. We considered
that it was better to keep the generated datasets with the one
second threshold because if the distance covered by an user
walking would be small, it becomes great if the user is in
a car.
From now on, we will use this reconstructed dataset as
a reference for our tests. After this filtering process, only
44 datasets contain records of Wi-Fi fingerprints and linked
locations.
3. Wi-Fi localisation from data collection
In this section, we explain how we evaluate the capabil-
ity of a Wi-Fi based localisation service whose data would
be collected by users.
As we explained earlier, our aim is to analyse if an
autonomous or distributed localisation service running on
users devices could work. Such a system already exist
and is named Global Positioning System (GPS). However,
a continuous use of GPS would drain the battery of the
devices [8]. This is why we focus on a system providing
localisations thanks to Wi-Fi fingerprints. Nonetheless, Wi-
Fi alone does not provide any location information. Then,
it is compulsory that devices have a strategy to determine
whether they shall store a Wi-Fi fingerprint and an associ-
ated location. Indeed, to be efficient, this service shall keep
the minimal set of fingerprints with linked locations. Then,
when a mobile device has its Wi-Fi interface activated, it
will receive messages from the ambient BSSIDs. The set of
these BSSIDs is a Wi-Fi fingerprint. If in the storage of the
device, there is no fingerprint close enough, then the device
shall turn on GPS and links location to this fingerprint.
We need to find a threshold based on the difference of
fingerprints so that the device knows if it shall add this
fingerprint with a location information or not.
3.1. Finding a Wi-Fi threshold
We consider as metrics the euclidean distance of Wi-Fi
fingerprint. To compute this distance we represent finger-
print as a vector whose components are the Received Signal
Strength Indication (RSSI). As we presented earlier, since
the users are not in the same environment we will not have
fixed length fingerprints as in [7]. Then when we compute
the distance between two fingerprints, they shall share at
least one BSSID. We calculate the euclidean distance by
only considering the RSSI of BSSIDs existing in the two
fingerprints.
We have then two metrics to consider, the number of
shared BSSIDs and the RSSI distance. We are going to
simulate the behaviour of a device which would embed
the autonomous version of the Wi-Fi localisation service.
For each user, we travel along the dataset from the first
fingerprint to the last one. We have sorted the fingerprints
per timestamp. We initialise a reference file with the first
fingerprint then for each fingerprint we compute the RSSI
distance, the number of shared BSSIDs and the geographic
distance between the locations of these two fingerprints.
After that, we are able to represent the values of geographic
distances depending on the RSSI distance and the number
of shared BSSIDs on Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Geographic distance error depending on RSSI
distance and number of shared BSSIDs
We observe on Fig. 1 that most geographic distances are
represented with red cross and are very close to zero meter,
which is very accurate. Nonetheless, we expected that we
would have seen a split or a border based on number of
BSSIDs or RSSI distance. We thought that the greater the
number of BSSIDs and the lower the RSSI distance, the
lower the geographic distance. But here we can notice that
we have geographic distances close to one hundred meters
while we have 14 BSSIDs and a RSSI distance between
−160 and −180 dB. And on the other side, we have several
points with close to zero meter distance which have less than
five BSSIDs and between −60 and −100 dB.
From that point we can only say that we should add a
new record when we have no BSSIDs in common or when
the RSSI distance is greater than −60 dB.
For the remainder of this study, we will keep as a
threshold to have more than one BSSID in common. We
will have from time to time errors greater than one hundred
meters but we will be able to reconstruct a bigger portion
of the set of locations.
3.2. Evaluation of the gain on dataset size
Before using the threshold that we defined on RSSI
distance, we want to evaluate the gain on the dataset size
based on the accuracy of the geographic distance. Our
user-centric localisation system shall keep the size of the
dataset as small as possible while covering the biggest set
of locations where the user went.
We start by evaluating on Fig. 2 the gain of each user
on the dataset size depending on a geographic distance
threshold. When we compare a new fingerprint to the set
of stored fingerprints, if the smallest geographic distance
between the new fingerprint and any fingerprints from the
dataset is greater than a pre-defined threshold, we add this
new fingerprint to the dataset. We compute the size of
datasets before and after thresholding. On Fig. 2, we observe
that when we increase the threshold, we increase the gain
on the dataset size. Since the accuracy level is less strict,
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Figure 2: Gain as percentage of the dataset depending on
the geographic distance threshold
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Figure 3: Covered dataset versus time using 1 meter thresh-
old
we can tolerate bigger errors and then we need less records
to cover the set of locations of an user. We notice that even
with one meter accuracy, we get half users having 20% gain
on their dataset size. We can also see that the lower limit is
always at the same gain, around 5%. This can be explained
by the fact that we have users with very small datasets; then
their dataset might have very few records which are close
enough to be replaced by another one.
Before moving to the analysis of the system with a Wi-
Fi based threshold, we evaluate if with the best accuracy that
we defined we are able to reconstruct the original dataset
locations or if some were missing. We also analyse within
how much time which percentage of the dataset locations
is covered. We analyse this behaviour per user. Since the
durations of datasets are not the same for the users, we use
a ratio of the dataset duration of each user. We present the
results on Fig. 3 for the ten users with biggest dataset size.
First of all, we see that for each user we reach the 100%
dataset covered. The second important information is that
we observe big steps for each user. This indicates that when
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Figure 4: Distribution of errors per number of shared
BSSIDs
an user gets to a new place, the system stores new records
and can reuse it till the moment when the user moves to a
new place.
3.3. Evaluation of Wi-Fi based localisation tech-
nique
We are now going to evaluate the performance of the
localisation when relying on Wi-Fi threshold we defined
earlier, more than one BSSID in common within two fin-
gerprints. We represent on Fig. 4 the distribution of errors
depending on the number of BSSIDs in common. We would
expect that errors would decrease as the number of BSSIDs
shared between two fingerprints increase. We see that the
lower limit is always very close to zero meter error, then
even with very few BSSIDs in common, we can reach the
best accuracy for some records. We also notice that the
median, quartiles and upper limit are decreasing when the
number of BSSIDs increase from two to ten. Nevertheless,
we observe a huge increase on third quartile and upper limit
when the number of BSSIDs is in the range of 12 to 17. Then
these values decrease again while the number of BSSIDs
increase. We assume that a possible explanation might come
from the imprecision of the localisation probe in some areas
and more specifically in indoor environments. Indeed, when
we are inside a building, a device receives generally Wi-
Fi signals coming from more APs in particular in an office
environment. Well, when a device is indoor, GPS signals are
harder to receive and then the accuracy of GPS decreases.
We think that this particular range might be linked to offices
buildings and this is why we get poor 3rd quartiles and upper
limits in this range. Nonetheless, we notice that the median
and the 3rd are respectively, most of the time, less than 25
and 50 meters, which is a good accuracy error. In order to
improve these results, we need to get a reliable localisation
reference.
We now check the effect of using the defined Wi-Fi
threshold on the covered dataset ratio in Fig. 5. In this figure,
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Figure 5: Covered dataset versus time using Wi-Fi threshold
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Figure 6: Gain on datasets sizes while using multiple users
we use the same users whose results were presented on
Fig. 3. We observe that the shapes present the same trend as
earlier. This indicates that we are able to cover almost the
same percentage of the dataset with the same records within
almost the same duration. However, we also notice that we
do not reach 100% of covered dataset. This can be explained
by the fact that, even when we have several BSSIDs in
common, we can get errors above 100 meters. Then, it is
possible that in the original dataset we have a fingerprint at
a location which is close enough to another fingerprint from
the learning dataset at another location. Then the location
covered by the fingerprint from the original dataset is lost.
To improve this result, we would have to define a more
discriminant threshold providing more accurate results on
geographic distance.
All the presented results till now deal with the au-
tonomous version of the localisation service. We are now
evaluating the impact of using multiple users. We present
on Fig. 6 the distributions of the best gain per user when
using combined datasets from two, three and four users. We
calculate the ratio of the size of the combined dataset by the
sum of the datasets of the implied users. We observe that
in the worst case, we have a 45% gain on the dataset size
and that half the datasets are more than 60% reduced. This
proves that there is an interest to use a collaborative Wi-Fi
localisation service.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the feasibility and the perfor-
mance of an user-centric Wi-Fi based localisation system.
We defined from the analysis of traces of several tens of
users a threshold on Wi-Fi so that a device knows if it shall
add a record to its database or if a record in the dataset
already handles this location. We have also analysed that
a collaborative version of this localisation service, using
several users to create the dataset, would benefit all users of
the system.
As a future work, we plan to develop an application
embedding the opportunistic communications capabilities,
to test if the collaborative version is efficient and can exist
in a fully distributed way without any server. We also plan to
analyse if the building of the dataset converges faster in the
collaborative version by exploiting the encounters with other
users of the system. We will also analyse to which extent
the privacy would be protected by such a system with and
without storing server.
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